Oct 9, 2012; Oakland, CA, USA; Oakland Athletics shortstop Stephen Drew (5) fields the ball against the Detroit Tigers during the fourth inning of game three of the 2012 ALDS at O.co Coliseum. Mandatory Credit: Kelley L Cox-USA TODAY Sports

I had been under the impression that the Tigers were looking for a replacement for Jhonny Peralta at short in part because of his current lack of range but also in part due to a desire to fill that position for more than the next year (after which Peralta’s contract will be up). Apparently – if Beck is to be believed – that is not the case at all. Puzzling, since while the Tigers do have some decent (and I say decent without any enthusiasm implied) middle infield prospects in the low minors, there is no one that looks to even potentially knock on the door in April 2014 (as their is with regards to corner outfield spots – where Dombrowski was nonetheless more than willing to give Torii Hunter a 2-year deal).

Is this solely because of concerns over Drew’s health and productivity, that is to say the risks involved in signing him, and not – as Beck maintains – because “the Tigers are looking short term”? That would make sense, I suppose. It can’t be because Dombrowski is looking ahead to the 2013-2014 free agent market for a solution to the Tigers’ problems. The best shortstop on the market after 2013 looks to be Peralta and the best second baseman (who could conceivably be asked to play short) looks to be Omar Infante. Maybe they’re looking to make a play on slick-fielding noodle bat Brendan Ryan? There is at least an argument to be made there, but signing a 32-year-old whose glove provides ALL of his value is dangerous. It isn’t, I would dearly hope, because the Tigers plan to blow this whole thing up after one last run at the pennant. So then why? I’d say if they think Drew is an upgrade over Peralta – give the man a 2-year deal! Hell, give the man a 3-year deal. What, seriously, is the alternative?

And more to the point: how do you abuse an unabusable CBA?

Oct 24, 2012; San Francisco, CA, USA; Detroit Tigers pitcher Justin Verlander (35) reacts in the fourth inning during game one of the 2012 World Series against the San Francisco Giants at AT

We all knew that the old system did nothing to create a level playing field for MLB teams or to ensure parity. The compensation system churned out sandwich picks for big-market teams as they shuffled free agents between themselves. A team with deep pockets could get a top-20 talent in the second round by offering him a top-10 signing bonus. The lack of any limitations on international signees allowed teams to shovel money into Dominican blue chips to make up for low or few draft picks. Those avenues to game the system are all mostly gone now – in terms of amateur acquisitions and development the new CBA does (or at least should) do a great deal to restrict attempts to simply buy a fresh farm system.

Unfortunately, the Detroit Tigers are in the unenviable position of needing to buy a fresh farm system after depleting their prospect pool by sacrificing first-round picks and dealing away talent mid-season year after year. I am not criticizing past Tigers decisions – the on-field product that Dave Dombrowski has put together has been among the best in franchise history and most of those prospects (and picks) sacrificed have not (yet) amounted to anything close to the players they bought.

So what can a well-run team with deep pockets do to try to game a system set up to make sure that the Milwaukee Brewers playoff chances (over a decades-long horizon) don’t differ too much from those of the New York Yankees? The first thing (and this should come as a surprise to no one) is that the new CBA – because it makes it difficult to build a team by reallocating resources from the big-league club to amateur signings – puts a premium on major league payroll. That probably isn’t what the owners of small-market clubs were hoping for – but there you are. The Tigers are playing that game well. If no team can put together a critical mass of pre-arbitration-eligible talent, and everybody gets a slow drip-feed of prospects to add to the big-league roster the teams that can afford to fill holes with cash are in a very good position. So I am not suggesting that the Tigers need to plan on rebuilding, just that something ought to be done to renew a pipeline that is very nearly dry.

The second thing is to make use of all the resources that the new system allots: There is a soft cap on international bonuses… use it. Or at the very least find a way to deal your extra “cap space” once that becomes possible. The Tigers have rarely been involved in pursuit of “blue chip” amateurs from Latin America – possibly due to very real concerns over risks and records. That ought to change. The Tigers have, on the other hand, signed a large number of lower tier Latin amateurs – so it certainly isn’t as though they lack a presence.

The third thing is “hold onto your guys”. It used to be a good plan to let a free agent go and sign his doppelganger – netting a sandwich pick in the process. That doesn’t work any more. If the Tigers were to – for example – let Justin Verlander go after 2014 and sign the next best starter out there to replace him both teams would sacrifice their first-round picks (not trade them) and get a sandwich pick to make up for it. Now it’s a net loss, not a net gain. You’re better off keeping your best guys (in addition to the fact that they are franchise icons) even if you’re gaming the system – which probably is the point of the whole thing.

The fourth (and most important) thing is to churn that roster. How do you have a fire sale and stay a 90 win team? By having more talent on the big-league roster than you could ever possibly use. The new CBA makes sure that a lot of near stars (and even some stars) will be available without draft pick compensation required. Presumably letting a guy go who you made a qualifying offer to – and replacing him with somebody that didn’t get a qualifying offer – is going to be a net negative for the big league roster (though you might save some cash). It’s not always the case, though, since guys dealt mid-season can’t get qualifying offers. That’s not really what I’m referring to – though – what I mean is that the best way to replenish a farm system looks to be to replace guys currently under contract with equivalent free agents and deal the guys you no longer need. That is the kind of move we have been hearing about in the case of Stephen Drew and Jhonny Peralta as well as Anibal Sanchez (who might free Rick Porcello to be traded). Both of those would – at least potentially – be canny moves and good ways to help fill out the farm system even if they did little to immediately benefit the big-league club. Moving guys like Justin Upton and Shin-Soo Choo probably makes more sense – to a team with resources – than acquiring them. The smartest move – as bizarre and un-Tiger-like as this might sound might actually be to trade Justin Verlander now for a supreme prospect haul after handing blank checks to both Anibal Sanchez and Zack Greinke. After the 2013 season Dombrowski should seriously consider dealing at least Max Scherzer and Rick Porcello and taking offers on Austin Jackson and Alex Avila while looking for replacement among tier 2 free agents.

Roster churn isn’t really a pleasant concept for most baseball fans, but the way the system is set up right now there is very little chance of getting anything worthwhile back once a player’s contract is up. That means that – if at all possible – the guy should be dealt before that happens. What that means is that – in order to “beat” the CBA – it is less important to have a high payroll ceiling (though that will also be relevant) as it is to make sure that you make smart free agent signings. If the guy is paid more than he is worth – he lacks trade value. That’s simple. If you sign a guy to a five-year deal and only expect him to earn it for the first two, you aren’t going to have any “value” to unload towards the end of the contract. As under the old agreements, the simple secret to long-term franchise success is less to use resources to buy wins but to use both resources and brains to create assets.

“I have a really bad feeling about this.”

Chris Hannum wrote a great overview comparison of Jhonny Peralta’s value versus Drew’s, and I wanted to expound on the idea a bit more, because this is an outrageously bad idea.

Oct 6, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Oakland Athletics shortstop Cliff Pennington (2) catches a pop fly while running into shortstop Stephen Drew (5) during the third inning of game one of the 2012 ALDS against the Detroit Tigers at Comerica Park. Mandatory Credit: Tim Fuller-US PRESSWIRE

For defense, Chris examined UZR/150 and DRS between the two players, but the differences go even further. The first and most important quality for a shortstop playing for Detroit has to be range – they’re covering not just the space a typical shortstop has to cover, but also a bit of third base’s territory due to Miguel Cabrera. Jhonny Peralta’s 2012 OOZ was 49, which was tied for third from last for all starting Major League shortstops. Drew’s was 37, which is the equivalent of an infant in a Power Wheels.

ErrR is a stat that measures the number of runs above or below average a fielder is, determined by the number of errors he makes as compared to an average fielder at that position given the same distribution of balls in play. Peralta sported an ErrR of 3.6 in ’12, and a 7.2 in ’11. Drew? In 2012 his ErrR was 0.4 in 2012, and 2.0 the season before. With DPR, which is double play runs above average, Peralta had Drew beat, 0.0 to -0.2, and that’s taking into account that Peralta played half his games with a rotating cast at second base. Even going with plain ol’ errors, Peralta had 7 in 149 games, and Drew had 8 in 75 games.

Peralta has the edge defensively (never thought I’d type that…), so the Tigers’ interest in Drew must be offensively-based, right? Well, Jhonny had a .145 ISO (Drew – .125), a .239/.305/.384 slash (.223/.309/.348), and a .301 wOBA (.291). So, it must be a right-left hitting difference that favors Drew, right? Peralta – .249/.303/.385 against righties, .214/.309/.383 against lefties. Drew – .234/.329/.368 against righties (where he’s supposed to have an edge), and .198/.260/.302 against lefties, which would actually compound Detroit’s issues against left handed pitching.

One could make the case that OF COURSE Drew’s stats are horrible for 2012 – he was injured! Well, to pull out another quote to reinforce a point, Ron Shandler says that “Health is also a skill.” It happens to be a skill that Drew lacks. He has never played in over 152 games in a season, including playing in 79 last year and 86 the year before. In 2009 he played in 135 games, and unfortunately displays a trait shared by his brother JD wherein a Drew cannot play through a minor injury. On a team where Ramon Santiago and Danny Worth would then get significant playing time at a crucial position, that is not a selling point.

Honestly, I have no idea why Dave Dombrowski would even consider adding Stephen Drew. Maybe sending Peralta to Arizona would be part of a blockbuster that nets Justin Upton, but that seems unlikely. Maybe this is a bluff to make teams with multiple shortstops think that the Tigers already have a plan in place, and then give up their piece more easily. I have no idea. All I know is that sending Peralta away and fitting Drew with an Olde English D is a very bad idea.